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“I Know It When I See It”:
The Supreme Court and the Changing Definition of Obscenity

Madelaine Setiawan
Lee University
(Cleveland, TN)

The Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity, even with many of the landmark decisions,
remains somewhat ambiguous. The 1800s unfolded the first obscenity cases in the nation brought
before the judiciary; the cases concerned materials believed to violate society’s values on
propriety and morality. The Supreme Court’s pursuit in defining obscenity uncovered a series of
legal tests to serve as guidelines for the community and lower courts. Still, the establishment of
legal tests did not guarantee a strict definition; the last of these tests established by the Supreme
Court, the Miller Test (1973), is still subjective and ambiguous. Since settling with the Miller
Test, the Supreme Court has not established any other national standards. Justice Stewart
reflected the Court’s attitude in his dissent for Jacobellis v. Ohio, stating his famous line, “I
know it when I see it,” suggesting the existing struggle in the Court to define legal parameters, as
one definition of obscenity cannot effectively be applied to every case nor can it stand the test of
time. The evolution of societal values throughout the years, from the 1800s to the 1900s, created
this difficulty that challenged the Supreme Court’s consistency. The 1960s introduced a sexual
revolution, which triggered a reaction from the Courts in an attempt to meet the demands of
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society’s evolving values on morality. The cases brought before the Supreme Court consistently
reflected the change in societal values: prior to the sexual revolution, the Court—always in
concurrence with society—deemed the challenged materials brought to them as obscene.
Following the sexual revolution, as society became more accepting, the Court deemed many of
the challenged materials not obscene. The concern within the spread of obscenity cases between
the 1800s and 1900s evolved accordingly to society’s values on morality, thus due to the change
in attitude and behavior, especially the growing acceptance of sensuality among Americans, the
Supreme Court had to adapt their definition of obscenity in parallel to the demands of society.
The emergence of the first obscenity cases, Rosen v. United States (1896) prompted the
integration of an English case into the Supreme Court. Without having established a legal test
nor definition, the Court adopted the Hicklin Test from an English case, Regina v. Hicklin
(1868), ruling obscenity as “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.” 1 Moreover, the Hicklin Test rejected the idea that the
subject matter must be taken as a whole, but rather argued the opposite: “It is not necessary to
show that a publication is obscene on every page. A publication may be obscene because part of
it is obscene.” 2 Rosen, as the defendant, pleaded not guilty after facing charges for depositing
obscene materials in the mail, in defense that the Rosen himself had no prior knowledge of the
subject matter to be obscene. The Supreme Court’s prosecution of Rosen v. United States (1896),
taking the Hicklin Test as its basis, set the precedent in justifying future prosecutions that
reflected the societal values of the 19th century. Without having mentioned the First Amendment

J. E. Hall Williams, “Obscenity in Modern English Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 20, no. 4
(Fall 1955): 630-647.
1
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in the opinion of the Court, the Judicial Branch eschewed obscenity, establishing that the First
Amendment does not constitutionally protect obscenity as freedom of expression nor of speech
and press–clarified later in Roth v. United States (1957). Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of
the Court, acknowledging “every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper,
writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character...are hereby declared to be
nonmailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails, nor delivered from any post office
nor by any letter carrier; and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited,
for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be non-mailable matter...shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 3 The 19th century cases saw prosecutions in favor of societal
values on morality with the Court mainly engaging with finding the challenged materials
obscene and prohibiting the dissemination of these materials. Though there was no basis except
for the Hicklin Test itself adopted from the United Kingdom, the 19th century values dictated the
decisions of the judiciary.
In 1957, the Supreme Court landed its first landmark decision in Roth v. United States
(1957). Combining both Roth v. United States (1957) and Alberts v. California (1957), the Court
established what qualifies a First Amendment protection. Roth and Alberts were both guilty of
mailing obscene materials in violation of the federal obscenity statute; both defendants argued
that government prohibition of dissemination of obscene materials impinged the First
Amendment provision of freedom of expression and press. Though Rosen v. United States
(1896) steered clear of mentioning the First Amendment altogether, Roth v. United States (1957)
formally established obscenity is not an area protected by the First Amendment, paving the way
for the Court to explicitly determine which category of expression warranted First Amendment

3

Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
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protection, and specifically what constituted obscene materials. Behind the argument to place
obscenity apart from First Amendment protection is a government that “has a significant interest
in protecting minors and unwilling passerby from being exposed to obscene materials, that the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving societal mores and values, and
lastly that obscenity ‘utterly lacks any redeeming social importance.’ The fundamental notion is
that these interests outweigh any benefit (and indeed the argument that there is no benefit) that
obscenity may have on society, and as such it is subject matter upon which regulation is
important and proper.” 4
A few years short of the start of the sexual revolution, societal values have evolved since
Rosen v. United States (1896). The Court found that the Hicklin Test no longer fit the model
standard of morality, as the test judges “obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it
must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.” 5 Roth v.
United States (1957) is illustrative of the Court’s attempt to create a uniform national standard;
the new parameters of obscenity then forms that: “For material to count as obscene ‘it must be
established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.’” 6 The underlying significance in Roth’s ruling is the
government guaranteeing First Amendment protection to materials with social value. A society
Kamilah Mitchell, “Let’s Talk About Sex: How Societal Value Evolution Has Redefined Obscenity,”
Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum 4, no.2 (Spring 2014): 517.
4

5

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

Kent Greenawalt, “Obscenity,” in Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 99-123.
6
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that was beginning to embrace the idea of the sexual revolution put the Supreme Court to its
realization that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals
with sex in a manner of prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific
works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press...It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the
protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest.” 7 In differing these two the Judicial Branch is symbolic to the
progressive changes occurring in society. For decades, Roth’s parameters provided sufficiency to
be the basis of future prosecutions for the judiciary. The sixty-year gap since Rosen v. United
States (1896) allowed the justices a fresh rumination of society’s demands, thus by far eclipsing
the standards found in the Hicklin Test.
Following the parameters constructed in Roth v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed them in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). The states convicted Jacobellis for showing a
movie the state allegedly deemed obscene. As the case was brought before the Court, the
dispositive question “is whether the state courts properly found that the motion picture involved
a French film called ‘Les Amants,’ was obscene and hence not entitled to the protection for free
expression that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 8 The tripartite
parameters in Roth recognized the social value in materials excluding it from being deemed
obscene. Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion of the Court: “We have viewed the film,
in the light of the record made in the trial court, and we conclude that it is not obscene within the
standards enunciated in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, which we reaffirm

7

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

8

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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here.” 9 However, the legacy of Jacobellis v. Ohio lies in Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion,
acknowledging the struggle to have a precise definition for the First and Fourteenth Amendment.
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” 10 What
Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) presented is the significant reduction of government prohibition in
monitoring obscenity. While the Hicklin Test would find the movie, “Les Amants” obscene,
Roth’s jurisprudence deemed it otherwise. Just as society’s values dictated the course of action of
the Court’s in Rosen v. United States (1896), the undeviating embrace of beliefs of the sexual
revolution equally impacted the Courts in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964).
To the extent that the First Amendment protects materials with social values, it also
protects a citizen’s private pursuit of obscene materials–books or films. Possessing obscene film
reels, which violated Georgia’s statute, brought Stanley’s litigation in Stanley v. Georgia (1969).
Such litigation then aroused the dispositive question of whether or not Georgia law impinges on
the First Amendment freedom of expression; put another way, “If the State can protect the body
of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia, protect his mind?” 11 Stanley v. Georgia (1969) in
specific will account for the rising leniency from the government, as the Court lessened
obscenity prohibitions within every case heard. The mindset of the Court here exemplifies a
society undergoing substantial change in norms and values. In the progress of resolving the case,
the Court did not believe “that this case can be decided simply by citing Roth. Roth and its

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

11

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest
cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any
other decision of this Court reaches that far.” 12 This statement conveys a subtle hint that Roth’s
precedent is no longer adequate for a society that continues to evolve. For the first time did the
Court explicate the importance of the First Amendment protection towards obscenity. “The
Court now has distinguished that personal privacy is fundamental to a free society, and ruled that
the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibited anyone to be charged of privately
possessing materials.” 13 Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the First Amendment brought to
light that “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.” 14 Such a liberal decision tells us the impact of societal values on the Court–that
jurisprudence on the topic of obscenity reflects the standards of society.
The Supreme Court’s pursuit in defining obscenity apexed in 1973, when Miller v.
California (1973) emerged before the Court. Miller v. California (1973) is significant because it
serves as fundamental guidelines for obscenity cases up to the present day. Since Roth v. United
States (1957), the Court did not change any of the established parameters, thus the creation of the
Miller Test embraces the necessity of this change as society’s demands increase. Compared to
the Rosen v. United States (1896) or Roth v. United States (1957), Miller v. California (1973)

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.
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promotes and accepts sexual freedom. The Miller Test is now the most prominent, also
establishing guidelines with three elements: “a) whether the average person applying
contemporary community standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” 15 Permanently abolishing the
requirement that the First Amendment protects those with redeeming social value, the Supreme
Court redefined the scope of First Amendment privilege. No longer would any work be deemed
obscene for not having social value, as the First Amendment guarantees a bigger area of
protection than before. Materials that would once be deemed obscene, “if they were preceded by
a poetry reading or followed by the recitation of some moral, it is under the Miller test, the value
of the entire work that is to be judged.” 16 The Miller Test continues to be effective because of its
subjectivity and ambiguity that forces it to be continually relevant and applicable. Central to
Miller v. California (1973)’s ruling is the fact that “Neither Miller v. California nor its progeny
settle the fundamental questions of whether government should, as a matter of policy, suppress
the distribution of obscenity, and of whether such suppression is consistent with first amendment
values. Nor have these cases resolved the question of what obscenity is. In fact, it shall be a
primary thesis of this that the Miller rules are best understood as the basis of a system of
obscenity definition in which the question of what is obscene (if not the question of what is not
obscene) need never be definitively answered.” 17 Subjectivity becomes strategic to follow along

15

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

16

Ibid.

“Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California,” Harvard Law Review
88, no. 8 (June 1975): 1839.
17
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society’s evolving values. Had the sexual revolution not occur, the Supreme Court would tackle
this case differently; however, because Americans demanded a change, the Supreme Court
needed to adapt to that change.
These changes included setting the Miller Test apart to cease activities concerning what
became a serious national problem across the nation: child pornography. The Supreme Court
drew a separation between obscenity and child pornography, and New York v. Ferber (1982) is
the Supreme Court’s attempt to solve this widespread issue. Whether or not this was the Supreme
Court’s reaction to the demands of society, the protection of minors is still as important since
Roth v. United States (1957). Justice White delivered the majority opinion of the Court, asserting
that, “The Miller standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does
not reflect the State’s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote
the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the
issue of whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work.” 18 The Miller Test does not qualify for child pornography as it belongs to an entirely
different class, and thus the First Amendment does not protect any form of child pornography.
New York. Ferber (1982) is set apart but may still rely on the Miller test: “the test for child
pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared
to it for the purpose of clarity.” 19
These judicial rulings on obscenity answers the question that the Supreme Court’s pursuit
in defining obscenity does, in fact, occur concurrently with the evolution of society. Societal

18

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

19

Ibid.
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values as well as the sexual revolution manifested their heavy influence when Roth v. United
States (1957) and Miller v. California (1973) are put into comparison. Using Roth v. United
States (1957) to validate the claim that the Court and society work concurrently, “Here is a prime
example of societal norms reflected in the cases brought before the judiciary. The 1940s and
1950s, if nothing more reflected an era of conservatism with a high emphasis placed upon the
sanctity of marriage and family life. Not surprisingly, in reflecting society’s attitudes and value
system, the one case which addressed the issue of whether or not the material was in fact
obscene, dealt with an assault on the aforementioned value system.” 20 At the bottom line of this
whole pursuit is society dictating the Supreme Court. Society constructs the changes around the
definition of obscenity, and the Court merely reacts to it. The norm and culture within the
American community was different at the time of Roth v. United States (1957) and Miller v.
California (1973). For instance, “During the 1940s and 1950s, when societal views on sexuality
were very conservative, the seminal obscenity case found the challenged material to be obscene.
However in present day, where society’s views on sex and sexuality are arguably more liberal,
one of the seminal obscenity cases found the challenged material not to be obscene.” 21 Had
Rosen v. United States (1896) reappeared in 1973, the Supreme Court would most likely not
enact the same ruling as 1896, as the standards of the Court depended on the standards of the
people. In the same way, had Miller v. California (1973) appeared in 1896, the Supreme Court
would most likely not establish the same legal parameters. What this means for the American
society as a whole then, is “that as society’s values have evolved, so too has the subject matter of
obscenity cases put before the judiciary, as is seen with the cases in the present day. As with the

20

Mitchell., 506.

21

Ibid., 509.
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cases brought before the judiciary in the 1940s and 1950s, the subject matter of the cases in the
2000s evidenced the dramatic changes of society’s views on sex and sexuality.” 22 Societal values
is the single largest contributing factor to the definition changes regarding obscenity. As long as
society keeps evolving, so will the Court’s standards. Behind this pursuit is the Supreme Court
and the American people working hand-in-hand to define obscenity together.
The leading push towards the evolving values and morality stemmed from the
introduction of the sexual revolution in the 1960s, which dramatically changed both society and
its values as well as the Supreme Court. The beliefs behind the sexual revolution that gave rise to
a new mindset provide explanation to why Supreme Court rulings after Roth v. United States
(1957) leaned more liberal. Historians John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman named the
revolution in specific sexual liberalism–a change that “encompassed a great variety of ideas and
behaviors,but at its heart it involved the modernizing of Victorian norms, generally within such
existing structures as marriage and heterosexuality. Thus, marital sexual pleasure, and even some
premarital sexual experimentation, became increasingly acceptable, aided by the sexualized
consumer culture and its accompanying advertising industry sprouting at the time.” 23 Concurrent
with this new mentality is a twentieth-century sex scandal involving Evelyn Nesbit, who
subsequent to the scandal pushed for a new portrayal and acceptance of female sexuality. Taking
advantage of her fame, Nesbit delved into the entertainment industry as an actress who
symbolized the current societal culture. Nesbit’s career highlights the fact that “while endless
press coverage of sensationalized scandal was nothing new, the frank discussion of pre and
extramarital sex showed a society publicly acknowledging and negotiating the tenuous

22

Ibid., 507-508.

Whitney Strub, Obscenity Rules: Roth v. United States and the Long Struggle over Sexual Expression
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 41.
23
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boundaries of acceptable sexual behavior, adjusting to the rising awareness that Victorian norms
failed to dictate urban modes of living.” 24 To summarize how heavy the sexual revolution
influenced Supreme Court cases, the Court established in Roth v. United States (1957) that the
First Amendment does not protect areas of obscenity; in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) that the First
Amendment prohibits government’s interference in a citizen’s private pursuit of obscene
materials; in Miller v. California (1973), that the First Amendment protects obscene materials if
the work is taken as a whole. Each new case that surfaced to the Supreme Court demonstrated a
First Amendment progression.
Women’s rights for a zone of privacy–especially the access to contraceptives–became the
focal point of the sexual revolution. The social pushback against the Comstock Act of 1873
which prohibited the spread of information about birth control and abortion spawned this new era
of modern sexuality and activists. Margaret Sanger saw the frequency of women “trapped in
cycles of unwanted pregnancies and unsafe, illegal abortions” commenting in her book that
[Comstock’s] neurotic nature and savage methods of attack had ruined thousands of women’s
lives.” 25 The drive for women’s right to birth control culminated in a judicial manifestation of a
modern sexuality mindset. Behind Stanley v. Georgia (1969) and Miller v. California (1973) is a
collective group of Americans demanding a zone of privacy, or in other means, a right to
personal autonomy. Fulfilling this demand is also the Supreme Court citing among many of the
constitutional rights, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the penumbra of the
Bill of Rights, specifically in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and later reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade
(1972). This zone of privacy justified Justice Marshall’s consent in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) to

24

Ibid., 39.

25

Ibid., 41.
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let a man possess or view obscene materials in his own home. The desire for a zone of privacy
derived from seeing birth control as fundamental to women’s lives, as “the Pill was a great
‘enabler.’ With The Pill, large numbers of college women could embark on careers that involved
long term, up-front time commitments in education and training as physicians, lawyers,
veterinarians, managers, and academics, among others.” 26 Without access to contraception,
women had no power to regulate pregnancies and the dream of pursuing a career became limited.
Sanger believed that a “woman’s power can only be expressed and make itself felt when she
refuses the task of bringing unwanted children into the world to be exploited in industry and
slaughtered in wars.” 27 Women’s right meant refusing to bear children, in part for the avoidance
of child labor and child pornography as well as to pursue their careers. The sexual revolution
rested around women “further assert[ing] her power by refusing to remain the passive instrument
of sensual self-gratification on the part of men.” 28 In essence, the sexual revolution is women’s
collective action, voicing their rights to a career instead of simply motherhood. According to
Margaret Sanger herself, birth control pills are the lesser evil to abortion; as “birth control has
always been practiced, beginning with infanticide, which is abhorred, and then by abortion,
nearly as bad. Contraception, on the other hand, is harmless.” 29 The liberal attitudes of the
Supreme Court that developed out of the sexual revolution did in a way support women’s rights.

Robert H. Frank, “The Sexual Revolution Revisited,” in Under the Influence: Putting Peer Pressure to
Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 82-83.
26

Margaret Sanger, “The Need for Birth Control (1922),” in For the Record: A Documentary History of
America, Volume 2, ed. David E. Shi and Holly A. Mayer (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 166-168.
27

28

Ibid.

Ingrid Mundt, “Margaret Sanger, Taking a Stand for Birth Control,” The History Teacher 51, no.1 (Nov
2017): 125.
29
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Government’s reduction of prohibition increased in concurrence with the society’s growing
acceptance of sexuality.
Notwithstanding the fact that the sexual revolution emphasized the need for birth control
among women, many historians also argue that what marked the sexual revolution significant
was not the pills, but rather, society’s new way of thinking about sex. In reality, “Many of the
behaviors predisposed by the pill were already common, albeit covert, features of American life
once the pill became available. The pill added fuel to a smoldering fire; it didn’t start the blaze,
but it certainly accelerated it and ensured its spread.” 30 The buildup to the sexual revolution in
the 1950s included the use of birth control pills, though it might not have been as widespread.
Meaning that at the time the Supreme Court heard Roth v. United States (1957), the
acknowledgment of birth control pills as a necessity and the liberal attitudes on sexuality had
already existed. Thus if the pinnacle of the sexual revolution did not escalate on birth control
pills, it escalated on society’s progress towards a liberal mindset and attitudes; and, “a far more
important predictor of the frequency with which people engaged in premarital sex in any era was
the degree to which people believed that it was socially acceptable to do so. And in circular
fashion, the degree to which people held that belief was itself strongly dependent on the
proportion of people who were engaging in premarital sex. That proportion, in turn, was the
result of many forces besides the pill.” 31 Women found birth control pills necessary to their lives
as it allowed them to either escape or put off motherhood, and for this reason, birth control pills
will always bear significance. Historian Elaine Tyler May emphasized that it was not
pharmaceutical agents that brought changes to societal values. “‘Pharmaceutical products have a

30

Frank., 81.

31

Ibid., 83.
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huge impact, but they’re not causal agents,’ May wrote. ‘Sexual behaviors change more as a
result of social changes than any kind of technological changes.’” 32 Just as societal values
impacted the Supreme Court’s rulings on obscenity cases, these same values also spawned the
sexual revolution with birth control a part of it. The advancement in technology undoubtedly
impacted societal values on sex, but these technology innovations did not cause the social
pushback against the Comstock Act or the social acceptance of premarital and extramarital sex.
Sociologist David John Frank reiterated this, stating that “How we think about sex matters a
great deal, of course, and technological innovations also played an important, if indirect, role in
how we think about sex.” 33 The combination of technological advancement as well as society’s
modern mindset together brought upon the sexual revolution and the liberal attitudes of the
Court. Nevertheless, only after the revolution, did “the days of women being creatures of the
home had all but dissipated with more than thirty million women in the workforce in 1990, and
nearly 20% women having obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher.” 34
Beyond the walls of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction on obscenity cases lies a
transformation of American values and norms. The ambiguity in defining the parameters of
obscenity takes root in a society that is constantly evolving. Rosen v. United States (1896)
presented a society where public discussion of sex was nonexistent; the only reasonable decision
then for the Supreme Court was to rule the challenged materials brought before them as obscene,
while also prohibiting the shipment of obscene materials. However, by the time Miller v.
California (1973) emerged before the Supreme Court, the spark of the sexual revolution had

32

Ibid., 84.

33

Ibid.

34

Mitchell., 503.
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gone by for a decade. The focus of the sexual revolution itself ought not to be on birth control
pills, though they carried the potential and thus the significance to change the course of a
woman’s life; but on the fact that society warmed up to the same beliefs that past communities
would have deemed obscene, such as during the time Rosen v. United States (1896) emerged in
Court. Certainly, technological advancements impacted how society approached beliefs and
ideas, but the judicial manifestation of liberal rulings solely came from societal values itself. As
society evolved its way of thinking, so did the subject matter within obscenity cases brought
before the judiciary; no longer did the Supreme Court take on cases to decide whether the
challenged material was obscene. The challenge of the Supreme Court consisted of finding the
arguments to which obscene materials had First Amendment protection and why. Since the
sexual revolution, the Supreme Court mainly focused on constitutional rights, whether it was
First Amendment freedom of expression or zone of privacy for women’s abortion. Regardless,
societal values dictated the Supreme Court’s rulings, creating a subjective definition of obscenity
to meet the demands of society.

About the author
Madelaine Setiawan is an undergraduate student at Lee University double majoring in History
and Political Science. She is the author of “An Unguaranteed Victory: Military Challenges in the
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